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Abstract
There have been two general approaches to
organizing for peace operations: an ad hoc
approach, in which entities independently
intervene and operate on the basis of their
unique expertise and interest; and a top –
down approach, in which all entities are
directed and controlled by a single authority.
Using the UN experience in Afghanistan, we
demonstrate how this view of the organizing
problem is limited. Instead, we develop a
typology that distinguishes among three
systems for organizing peace operations-
Command, Market and Community – on the
basis of their differences on four analytic
dimensions (agency, social attachment, so-
cial control and inter-organizational
relations). Our analysis of the UN experience
in Afghanistan demonstrates the utility of our
framework for both theory and practice.
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How to organize for effective peace operations? This question has bedeviled
International Organizations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), national
governments and military organizations since the founding of the United Nations,
especially since the end of the Cold War.1 Report after report has documented the
failures and challenges involved in peace operations (Jett, 1999; Schmidl and Oakley,
2000; Thakur and Schnabel, 2001).
Peace operations entail three principal activities: conflict prevention and
peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.2 Taken together, they involve a
wide-ranging set of tasks: protecting and delivering humanitarian assistance; facilitating
an end to the violence and monitoring cease-fires; disarming and demobilizing former
fighters; destroying weapons; reintegrating former combatants into civilian life;
returning refugees and displaced persons; clearing land mines; training of new police
forces; monitoring human rights; supporting constitutional, judicial and electoral
reforms as well as economic rehabilitation and reconstruction (Roberts, 1996; DPKO,
2001).
Given the enormity and complexity of the tasks during all phases of peace
operations, organizing the various military units, relief and development agencies,
international governments, and local entities is a daunting undertaking. Two general
approaches to organizing peace operations have been attempted. The first is what we
are calling the ad hoc, independent agent approach in which no overarching authority is
recognized as responsible for coordinating all international, national, regional and local
entities. Instead, each entity sends out its own representatives who are then expected
to report back to their policy makers for guidance and direction.
In the absence of an inter-organizational infrastructure of authority that all
entities acknowledge, field operatives begin to develop professional and personal
relationships to assist them in their work. They understand the importance of
mutual assistance and the vital role all entities play as they engage in peace
operations. Unfortunately, whether they are donors, NGOs and IOs or host
government officials, they end up developing ‘‘stunningly’’ complex webs of
relationships (Martin 2000; Martin and Miller 2000) in order to get things done at
the operational level.
Despite its attractive features for those working close to the action, the ad hoc
independent approach has its critics (e.g. Brahimi 2000). When intervention entities
operate with almost complete organizational independence they create a ‘‘coordination
nightmare’’ (Martin 2000: 23) that results, ultimately, in program inadequacies and
failures, service overlap, inefficiency, and waste (Crocker et al. 1999; Donini 1996;
Donini et al. 1996; Sommers 2000; Reindorp and Wiles 2001).
To address these coordination concerns, some have called for a more centralized,
comprehensive, and integrated approach to peace operations, or what we are calling
here as the ‘top-down’ approach. The Brahimi Report (Brahimi 2000) is one such
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example. It calls for increasing the capacity for information management and
strategic analysis at the top of the organization, improved mission guidance and
leadership, the establishment of rapid deployment standards with ‘‘on call’’
expertise, and the creation of integrated mission task forces for planning and support
(2000: viii-xv).
For those who have attempted it, the transition from an ad hoc to a top – down
approach in peace operations has been challenging. The 1997 UN intervention into
Afghanistan is a case in point. As described in the next section, the intervention
called for the creation of a top – down strategic framework to guide all relief and
recovery efforts of all entities. One of the greatest difficulties of the intervention
turned out to be a conceptual one. Organizing was viewed as a choice between
two mutually exclusive organizational options: either devise a top-down strategic
framework that all in-country operatives and policy makers would use to guide
their plans and action; or alternatively, continue to base peace operations on the ad
hoc efforts of independent entities. No other organizing possibilities were
recognized.
Our goal in this article is to show that there is a greater range of options to
address the organizing problem in peace operations. To this end, section 2
introduces a conceptual framework we have developed to identify three different
organizing systems. At one end of the continuum is a Command System—the top –
down control-based approach. At the other end is the Market System—the ad hoc free
agent-based approach. The third organizing option—the Community System—lies
midway along the continuum, and is based on collaborative relations of mutual
interest and shared common purpose. Applying the conceptual framework to the
Afghanistan case, we find evidence of the emergence of a special purpose
Community and the limitations of the Command and the Free Agent approaches for
relief and recovery efforts.
The article concludes with suggestions for follow-on research. Additional
theory building requires specifying the conditions under which each form of
organizing is likely to be successful. We identify two notable conditions in this
case: the phase of the peace process and the nature of the problems that are
confronted.
Before we introduce the Afghanistan case, there is a caveat to what follows.
Although there are both intra-organizational and inter-organizational dimensions to the
coordination problem, our primary focus will be on the latter. As reflected both in
numerous UN reports and in our analysis, this appears to be the critical issue in terms
of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of peace operations overall. Because of its
enormous size, diversity of purpose, and multi-unit complexity, we will view the UN
not as a single organization, but regard its many agencies and divisions as more-or-less
autonomous organizations in themselves. Thus, for the purpose of this analysis, we
place UN organizations on the same plane as all other organizations, in terms of their
inter-organizational relations.
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CASE: RELIEF AND RECOVERY IN AFGHANISTAN3
Crisis conditions
For more than two decades before the US-led incursion against Taliban and Al-Qaida,
Afghanistan had been plagued by war and its consequences. The long years of conflict,
destruction and death brought the collapse Afghanistan’s basic institutions and the
virtual exhaustion of its human capital. Some 50,000 combatants, of its population of
more than 20 million, had been actively engaged in fighting. The expected move
toward resolution of the Afghan conflict, following the Soviet Union’s withdrawal in
1989, had not happened. Instead, in the absence of a legitimate government with full
territorial control, the country was wracked by a fierce destructive civil war between
the Taliban and opposing regional warlords. This pushed Afghanistan to the very brink
of total societal collapse.
By 1997, devastated by more than two decades of war, Afghanistan had been
designated by the UN as a ‘country-in-crisis’, in that it lacked peace and security, and a
legitimate state government. Its societal and civil infrastructure had been destroyed, its
economy was unable to meet basic subsistence needs, and its population was constantly
threatened by poverty, famine, disease, dislocation, violence and death. In short,
Afghanistan’s crisis was a problem of urgent, gigantic humanitarian proportions and
one that involved myriad dimensions of complexity.
International assistance
Responding to this crisis were numerous non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), United Nations’ agencies (including UN headquarters) and bilateral
and multi-lateral donors, particularly in the areas of health, education and mine
clearance. All entities tended to work independently, and all suffered from
declining funds. There was no joint effort to define ‘the problem’ or to co-
organize what needed to be done. No single authority or institutional
infrastructure coordinated operations, and there were few channels for direct
communication. The lack of inter-organizational relations also made it difficult to
resolve the strong value or policy differences needed to build a consensus for
relief and development work.4
The destruction of Afghanistan’s indigenous infrastructure added further
complications to the international response effort. International political organiza-
tions intervened to guide the peace process, searching to end hostilities and
facilitating negotiations for security agreements to restore peace and stability
between the warring parties. But the lack of political infrastructure resulted in
chaotic, ineffective intervention efforts. In the absence of a state structure and
legitimate channels for regional and local representation, the international entities
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often decided what needed to be done, becoming, in effect, surrogates for
governmental authorities. Their efforts often reduced local autonomy and increased
local dependence.
This pattern of intervention produced an ad hoc approach to organizing peace
operations (see Figure 1) by default—a multiplicity of freely operating independent
assistance agencies, each following different mandates, relying on different funding
sources, establishing its own operational procedures and constraints, and providing
Figure 1: Ad hoc bottom– up organizing in peace operations
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similar, if not redundant, assistance services. Moreover, the effectiveness of an entity’s
intervention was often undermined by the limited coordination among the
international political organizations, the relief and development organizations and
the indigenous representatives. Such basic problems of inter-organizational commu-
nication and coordination meant that the effectiveness of the various intervention
efforts was severely limited.
UN intervention
By 1997, the United Nations’ Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) and
the Consultative Committee on Programme and Operational Questions (CCPOQ)
were ready for a new approach. Their review of UN peace operations’ policies and
practices found that current relief and development efforts were neither efficient nor
effective. They saw a critical need for more of a top – down approach: the creation of a
‘‘strategic framework’’ (described later) to guide relief and recovery work among all
stakeholders in a particular country-in-crisis. This approach was different enough from
the ad hoc independent agent approach to require pilot testing. After considering six
countries-in-crisis, the ACC selected Afghanistan. On the assumption that the war was
about to end, the UN dispatched an Inter-Agency Mission Team to conduct the first
pilot test.
Inter-Agency Mission Team5
The Mission Team was charged with drafting, in collaboration with in-country
partners, a strategic framework establishing the principles, policies and practices that
would guide all international partners in their relief and development work in
Afghanistan. The framework also was to ensure that collaborative consultations
continued among all international and indigenous entities, when hostilities ceased, and
would enable, ideally, the emergence of a comprehensive strategy for dealing both
with immediate security and political needs, and emerging humanitarian and economic
development. The hope was that all would benefit from the systematic sharing of
information, knowledge, and perspectives that affect both domestic and political
environments in Afghanistan.
In its assessment of Afghanistan,6 the Mission Team characterized the coordination
problem as ‘formidable’. It found that current arrangements, of ‘coordination by
consensus’, in which the United Nations’ coordinator acted as advocate and facilitator
of all in-country organizations, was clearly ineffective. It also found that international
interventions were plagued by ‘unclear objectives, doubts and fears about impact and
effectiveness’, ‘inefficiencies, lack of economies of scale, a multiplicity of agencies and
duplication’.
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Organizing the Afghanistan pilot
Once the ACC selected Afghanistan as the pilot, the Inter-Agency Mission Team began
its work in earnest. The Mission Team leader, a UN veteran, planned a series of
activities to build momentum and support for the overall effort: pre-workshop team
building; planning and site visits to Afghanistan prior to the workshop; an in-country
collaborative workshop in Afghanistan for all partners, including NGOs and donors;
post workshop visits throughout Afghanistan to confer with agency leaders and
members; Mission Team drafting of the strategic framework and feedback on it from
local agencies; approval of the strategic framework at the policy level in New York;
and finally, implementation of the framework at the field level by the original
workshop members.
A number of factors complicated and stymied these advance preparations. Although
the original plan was to test the pilot in a country free of war, the hostilities in
Afghanistan continued. The ACC decided to proceed nonetheless due to the interest
and commitments from various supporting agencies and contractors. For safety,
however, the workshop was moved to Islamabad, Pakistan. A second complication was
that the whole Mission Team was unable to meet before the workshop began—Mission
Team members were available only for a limited time7 and other key UN staff
members had other engagements. These complications meant that there was
insufficient time to follow the pilot’s original plans and meetings, and that because
the Mission-Team leader had to build political support, overall project management
and organization were minimal.8
The Islamabad workshop
Despite the start-up difficulties and challenges of travel more than eighty people
attended the five-day Islamabad workshop, which was held to gather useful information
from all stakeholders to inform drafting of the strategic framework. Participants came
from various UN field agencies, bilateral and multi-lateral donors, Afghan and
international NGOs and the Red Cross Movement. Although initially reluctant, due to
the start up problems, eventually the participants generated a wealth of useful
information.9 The end product was an assessment of Afghanistan’s crisis, the
identification of issues participants wanted addressed in some order of priority and the
development of strategies to deal with selected strategic issues (Mission Report 1997).
The creation of a strategic framework
After the workshop concluded, the Mission Team began the task of drafting a strategic
framework for Afghanistan. It was expected to use the results from the Islamabad
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workshop, additional data collected from relief and recovery operatives in field visits to
Afghanistan (Khandahar, Herat, Jalalabad, Feyzabad and Kabul), and information from
UN agencies, regional coordinators and donors. Yet an evaluator found that the
Mission Team did not acknowledge or use the workshop output ‘‘in any meaningful
way’’ nor was it clear how these additional data were used in drafting the strategic
framework (Mission Report 1997: 5 – 6).10
By the end of October 1997, the Mission Team completed its initial draft of the
strategic framework (Draft Strategic Framework 1997). It received mixed reviews. An
independent consultant, while praising the UN’s first-ever effort its innovation,
constructive intent and support generated among the stakeholders, found that the draft
did not appear to provide the interested governments with ‘ ‘‘principles and criteria for
assistance’’ ’ and concluded that it was not a ‘‘very clear document with down-to-earth
recommendations’’ (Minear 1997: 1 and 10, respectively). Concurring with this
assessment, another reviewer doubted how the document could ‘‘be the driving
instrument’’ for ‘‘long-term reform and performance improvement’’ (Mission Report,
1977: 9).
Following various institutional reviews the Mission Team produced a revised, final
document in September of 1998 which it believed would ‘‘facilitate the transition
from a state of internal conflict to a just and sustainable peace through mutually
reinforcing political and assistance initiatives’’—the UN’s overarching goal in
Afghanistan (Strategic Framework 1998: 4). As described in the official UN
document:
the strategic framework defines the principles, goals and institutional arrangements for a more coherent,
effective and integrated political strategy and assistance program. It provides a common conceptual tool
to identify, analyze and prioritize key issues and activities on the basis of shared principles and
objectives. The Strategic Framework comprises a political strategy and field-based arrangements for the
common programming of international assistance, (Strategic Framework 1998: 1)
Assessment of the strategic framework approach
Considering the strategic framework approach in Afghanistan to be a success, the UN
issued generic guidelines to replicate the effort in other crisis countries (A Simple
Guide 1998; Draft Generic Guidelines 1998). However, a participant of the original
Mission Team, and an expert on Afghanistan from UN headquarters, added some
caveats concerning the strategic framework approach:
From an institutional perspective, the SF (strategic framework) is predicated on a more ‘constraining’
coordination model, going well beyond coordination of those who agree to be coordinated. There are
many moving parts in Afghanistan and . . . getting them to all read from the same sheet of music is a bit
like herding cats. (Donini 2000: 7).
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Although this same expert did identify some successes—the coordination of emergency
responses and area-based integrated programs—he felt the effort ultimately had limited
application because the ‘‘political UN was institutionally averse to working closely with
its humanitarian and human rights counterparts’’ and because ‘‘there were different
views at UN headquarters and in the field as to who was in charge overall’’ (Donini et.
al. 2004: 129). Moreover, speaking with ‘‘one voice’’ or working for the greater good
rather than for narrow agency interests (were) new concepts which went against the
grain and the institutional reflexes of most agencies (Donini 2000: 7). In short, he
believed that ‘‘shifting from coordination as consensus to coordination as manage-
ment’’ faced resistance, despite the ‘formal subscription of all aid actors to the more
‘‘muscular’’ coordination methodology prescribed by the SF’ (Donini 2000: 7).11,12
Summary
The Secretary General approved the test project for the purpose of creating a coherent
policy among all organizations intervening in crisis countries. Afghanistan was selected
for the pilot test, and the Inter-Agency Mission Team was dispatched and charged to
use a collaborative approach to draft the strategic framework based on information
from indigenous sources and stakeholders, and an in-country workshop in Islamabad. In
reality, however, the Mission Team largely ignored the information from these sources
and created the draft strategic framework virtually in isolation. Its top – down
organizing approach paralleled the strategic framework’s emphasis on a top – down
plan to guide Afghanistan’s relief and recovery.
CASE ANALYSIS: SOLVING THE COORDINATION PROBLEM?
Our analysis of the evidence indicates a clear movement toward a top – down approach
to organizing peace operations (see Figure 2). The UN’s attempt to craft a strategic
framework for Afghanistan to guide political, assistance and development strategies was
a challenging and ambitious undertaking involving hundreds of people across the UN
system and within the NGO and donor communities. Moving from an independent
agent system of coordination to a top – down approach is not a light undertaking,
especially in a system as politically and organizationally complex as the UN. Although
the effort was commendable, its execution suffered from numerous difficulties and
limitations, as noted. However, even if the move had been successful, our analysis
suggests that such a top – down approach to coordinate intervention efforts is not likely
to be a good fit for countries-in-crisis.
In more specific terms, our investigation suggests that the Afghanistan pilot,
although producing some positive benefits, stopped well short of solving the
‘coordination problem’. A top-down strategic framework for Afghanistan was actually
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drafted and approved, but it required a year-long effort, and did not appear to
substantively link all UN agencies at headquarters nor make the connection between
organizations at the policy and operational levels (Minear 1997: 5).13,14
Figure 2: Top-down organizing in peace operations
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One could argue that the flaws in the top-down effort identified here might have
been avoided or even corrected with better leadership, project management and
planning, training and preparation.15 While there was room for improvement at all
steps in the two-year strategic framework process and the subsequent activities in the
field, we believe, however, that such a top-down approach for integrating activity
among many large, complex bureaus under crisis conditions is unlikely to be effective.
As shown in this case, writing a framework takes a great deal of time, and has to
include cooperation among many powerful stakeholders both within and outside the
UN system. By the time agreement is achieved (assuming that it can be),
environmental changes are likely to outdate whatever agreements stakeholders have
reached. In short, the strategic framework process is neither flexible nor quick enough
to be useful for large, complex, international bureaucracies within weak authority
structures, especially when dealing with the extremely complex problem of organizing
peace operations.
From a broader perspective, our analysis suggests that much more than a
‘coordination problem’ is at issue here. Beyond the largely gratuitous recognition of
the ‘complicated’ nature of countries-in-crisis situations by UN headquarters level and
by the Mission Team, there was a lack of analysis of the nature and dimensions of the
problem that Afghanistan posed for organizing the intervention effort. This was due,
primarily, to the Mission Team’s top – down approach to the development process of
drafting the strategic framework. Although the Mission Team had planned and
promoted development of the Framework as a collaborative process involving
indigenous representatives and agents from development organizations, as instructed
by UN headquarters, instead it minimized collaboration by keeping itself apart from
interaction with these participants. Insulating itself in this way, the Mission Team
ignored the wealth of useful factual data and other information provided on the
‘realities’ of Afghanistan from these sources.
Had the Mission Team worked collaboratively it is likely that information on the full
complexities of Afghanistan’s situation, as a country-in-crisis, may have entered the
drafting process. Thus instead of top – down organizing,16 the strategic framework may
have been based more on an approach that, in the Mission Team’s own words, involved
the formation of ‘‘a community with shared principles, complementary purposes and
common goals’’ to which all could subscribe.17 The Mission Team’s use of the term
‘‘community’’ is ironic, given the additional organizing approach proposed below.
But openness to other organizing alternatives was precluded by the view of the peace
operations problem as a choice between two mutually exclusive organizational options.
Virtually without exception, a review of the history of UN-sponsored interventions
into crisis situations shows an alternation, at different times, primarily between two
organizational extremes: either an ad hoc bottom – up independent agent approach,
with minimal centralized control and collective constraints; or a top – down approach,
with attempts at highly centralized coordination and control. As evidenced in
documents from both UN headquarters and the Mission Team, this was the restricted
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view of the available options for organizing peace operations in Afghanistan. In terms of
organizational theory, this view reflects a lack of awareness of options to organizing
other than hierarchy or free agent market-based approaches (e.g., Ostrom, 1990
Thompson et al. 1991; Ebbers 1997), including those that synergistically combine
elements of both extremes.
Our purpose in the following section is to construct a typology that distinguishes
among three different patterns of collective organization that are possible in peace
operations. We place the top – down and bottom – up approaches on either end of an
organizational continuum comprised of four analytic dimensions (agency, social
attachment, social control and inter-organizational structure), rename them as
Command and Market organizing types, respectively, and identify a third approach to
organizing – Community – that falls somewhere between these two extremes (see Figure
2). The four analytic dimensions, described below, provide a systematic basis for
describing the distinguishing characteristics of the three types of organizing.
A TYPOLOGY OF ORGANIZING APPROACHES
Collective organization is a purposeful effort, requiring activation of the bonds of
attachment among individuals to mobilize their energy and the direction and
coordination of their actions in pursuit of the collective goals (Bradley and Pribram
1998). Four analytic dimensions (agency, social attachment, social control and inter-
organizational relations) derive from this definition and are used to characterize
differences in the three types of organization (see Table 1).
Agency conceptualizes the purposeful nature of peace operations. We distinguish
three different ways individuals can pursue the goals of relief and development:
through compliance, through collaboration and through competition. Compliant agents
implement organizational directives with little or no discretion. Collaborative agents
establish goals and actions by mutual agreement. Competing free agents compete with
one other in pursuit of their own goals and interests.
Social attachment refers to the nature and form of affective connection among
members. It is a lateral order of socially equivalent relations which processes the
movement of affective energy and its organization for expenditure as social action –
namely, as segmented role relations, distributed mutually reciprocated relations or as
discrete dyadic transactions.
Social control refers to the nature and form of social constraints established to
regulate and direct member behavior. As a dimension of the collective, it locates each
individual in a social position of unique spatial and temporal social constraints in
relation to the collective effort. Social control may be organized in different ways –
namely, as a centralized hierarchy of formal relations, as decentralized, reciprocal
relations of multi-party regulation or as dyadically specific relations of domination,
cooperation or competition.
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The fourth dimension in Table 1, inter-organizational structure describes the emergent
order of relations generated when organizations of the same type inter-connect with
one another. This emergent pattern can range from a bounded ‘hub and spoke’
network18 of formal relations centered around a dominant organizational entity,
through an open actor-centered self-interest network of informal relations, to a
partially bounded fully inter-connected network of mutual interest relations linking all
parties involved.
Organizing alternatives
Whereas a command system of organizing is a control-based approach, in which
attachment is segmented by role and compliance is centralized under a single authority,
a market system is highly decentralized, a free agent-based approach involving discrete
dyadic relationships established between self-interested competing independent agents.
Organizing as a community of mutual interest – a special purpose community, in
sociological jargon (Suttles 1972; Bradley 1973) – lies between these two extremes. It
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is a collaboration-based approach, in which organizational entities recognize their
interdependence and build extensive cooperative networks as the means to share
information and resources and direct their actions in coordinated operations of mutual
interest.19
Command approach
The Command approach assumes that, irrespective of the complex, multi-party,
turbulent environment within which peace operations are executed, an organizational
entity itself is best situated to determine its policy and implement action. This is thought
to hold regardless of the organization’s size, and whether it is an international, national,
regional or local entity. Thus each organization engaged in peace operations has a policy
making unit that establishes direction at the top and policy execution at the bottom.
When implemented, the Command approach involves linking all entities into a
single, hierarchical system of formalized relations of collective control. An organization
is chosen and granted authority for peace operations. All entities assigned to peace
operations then are expected to report to it – to act as compliant agents. Leaders at the
chosen organization’s strategic apex rely on command and control systems to plan
activity among all entities. Coordination is formal and deliberate, linking policy making
with field operations. To respond to a rapidly changing environment, the organization
modifies its centralized control system by introducing task forces and project teams,
delegating responsibility to them while retaining oversight authority to govern their
decisions and outputs. However, inter-organizational linkages and alliances are difficult
to establish and maintain because each organization supports different values, pursues
different mandates and goals and uses different means (‘‘conditionalities’’) and
resources to achieve their diverse ends. The challenge is to coordinate this diversity
under a single central authority that all organizations acknowledge.
The resulting structure among multiple organizations is a rigid network of
relationships, reflecting dyadically discrete formal agreements established between the
organization and other organizational entities. Because the network is centered on the
organization’s own interests and needs, its structure is radial, like a ‘hub and spoke’
system. Also, based on formalized agreements reflecting the organization’s goals and
policy, new conditions or needs require renegotiation to modify agreements, with the
result that the network is slow to adapt and change.
Market approach
At the other end of the continuum, is a market system. This organizing approach
assumes that the environment of peace operations is so turbulent and fraught with
uncertainty, that the implicit order of the ‘‘hidden hand’’ of the ‘market’ in which all
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entities involved operate, is the best way of allowing their respective actions to be
organized. It is based on the belief that policy makers at the top of individual
organizations are too removed, and respond too slowly to be effective in the fast ever-
changing environment of peace operations. Thus, aside from some general guidance
from their policy headquarters, field operatives have to ‘make it up as they go’ in order
to constantly adjust to very challenging circumstances. The organization’s operatives
act essentially as autonomous agents. Doing their jobs requires building informal
relationships with others in their self-interested pursuit of getting things done.
Regardless of organizational affiliation, they make connections and develop specific
relationships to help them in their work.
This connection building activity produces a multiplicity of open (unbounded)
networks, composed primarily of discrete dyadic relationships, which change according
to the specific needs and interests of the independent operative. As a system, the open
networks are only partially interconnected through relations with overlapping contacts;
there are also unconnected networks, and isolated dyads and individuals. Thus, because
there is no uniform bond of attachment among all entities, communication is localized
to specific sub-nets of relations, and coordination is ad hoc. Indeed, the emergent
structure of the whole system is highly likely to produce redundancy, dysfunction, and
contradiction in the action outcomes of different entities.
Community approach
Between these two extremes lies organizing as a special purpose community. This
organizing approach assumes that field operations in the very difficult environment of
peace operations must be flexible and adaptable. Since no single entity has the
information, resources and capability to address all the needs and requirements to be
successful alone, this approach emerges when two or more organizations recognize that
working together affords them mutually beneficial outcomes. It requires that the
organizations involved come together and negotiate a broad common mandate – a
shared inter-organizational framework for joint action – that will define their collective
effort. In doing so, the organizations establish connections and channels of
communication among all parties, share information and provide resources toward
their collaborative effort. The common mandate is general enough to guide the
collaborative activity on the ground, while still allowing field operatives with the
flexibility to adapt and change, as circumstances require.
The special purpose community is essentially an informal collaboration of
stakeholders, who, by virtue of sharing a common interest in a difficult problem,
agree to work together as a group in their efforts to understand the problem and
develop a viable solution. Based on collegial norms of honesty and trust, and fully
inter-connected in a self-organizing system of co-evolving cooperative relationships,
participants engage in open, reflexive communication aimed at the discovery and
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sharing of new information. Because communication is transparent and information is
distributed among all participants, the interactional logic of collaboration in the special
purpose community creates the organizational capacity for a reflexive constantly
evolving cooperative rationality (Piaget 1995 [1965]).20
The resulting organizational structure is a bounded network of mutually regulated
cooperative relations linking all interested organizations in a community of common
purpose. The community boundary is dynamic, moving with new needs and functions
as organizations join or leave the collaborative effort. The community provides the
structural means for communication, coordination and collaboration for work
accomplishment. It affords a highly adaptable and flexible organizational form, which,
within the broad terms of the common mandate, is self-organizing and adaptive as
situations change on the ground.
In short, with its rationality constantly co-evolving from the ongoing gathering and
sharing of new information about both the problem and potential solutions, the
cooperative basis of special purpose community provides an important alternative to
organizing peace operations.
Application of typology to the Afghanistan case
There is evidence that a special purpose community was beginning to emerge among
participants in the Islamabad workshop. As noted above, the Mission Team viewed the
workshop as a stand alone activity. The limited advanced planning and preparation
coupled with the arrival of a significantly larger than expected throng of participants
threatened to overwhelm the workshop’s resources and propel it to the brink of
disarray. Faced with this prospect and the need for immediate action, the workshop’s
designer/facilitator decided to forgo the top – down control approach characteristic of
UN meetings, and pursued more of a collaborative approach to the workshop’s design
and organization by asking the participants to develop norms that they would use to
regulate their interaction.
Within the context of a set of mutually agreed social constraints the participants
developed to guide their interactions, a self-organizing system began to emerge from
the open-ended interactions by a feed-forward process. The workshop’s design evolved
in a continuous process, in that interactions and activity at a given moment naturally
fed into and gave direction to subsequent action. By pausing to reflect, at regular
intervals, on their present behavior and the workshop’s activities, participants made
their subsequent actions contingent upon what they were learning as the process
unfolded. In this way, the workshop evolved spontaneously through a self-reflexive,
feed-forward process that was constrained only by its self-imposed rules for participant
behavior – the participants’ ‘‘guidelines’’ for interaction.
As the participants worked through a number of exercises in various groups and sub-
groups to identify strategic issues of interest, they iterated through different groupings
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of stakeholders. This process generated an increasingly more extensive network of
attachments, connecting individuals to others with whom they previously had little
direct contact or relationship. This growing criss-crossing pattern of relations among
all participants not only helped to create a more inclusive and more comprehensive
product – the contents of their input to the Inter-Agency Mission team—but it also
generated a latent by-product: a rudimentary community of connections among the
workshop’s diverse stakeholders. These connections, if they were able to continue
beyond the workshop, would be a social resource of mutual benefit that had the
potential to lay an infrastructure for future, joint collaborative projects in
Afghanistan.21
CONCLUSION
The initial impetus for this work came from research (conducted by the first author) on
a UN project in 1997 to develop a strategic framework to direct relief and recovery in
Afghanistan. In its desire for more effective peace operations, the UN endeavored to
move from an ad hoc bottom – up approach involving independent agents, toward more
of a top – down approach that gave strategic guidance under a single authority.
Although the UN ultimately did approve the strategic framework for Afghanistan, the
document failed to provide the integrated direction to coordinate political and
assistance activities, and policy and field-based activities in a timely fashion. And while
it is possible that correction of the deficiencies in the Mission Team’s process may have
produced some improvement in the end result, we believe that this top – down
strategic framework approach is not amenable nor is it flexible enough to be an
effective means for coordinating peace operations in these types of situations. Our
analysis of the Afghanistan case suggests that a different organizing approach is
necessary if the effectiveness of UN-sponsored interventions to aid countries-in-crisis is
to be improved.
Much of the basis of the UN’s coordination problem appears to stem from a self-
limiting view of peace operations as a choice between two extreme alternatives: an ad
hoc bottom – up approach or a top – down approach to organizing. The evidence shows
that neither approach appeared very effective in the Afghanistan case.
What emerged from our analysis was the recognition of a third type of organizing
for peace operations: organizing as a special purpose community—a collaboration-based
approach where organizational entities recognize their interdependence, build
cooperative networks to share information and resources and direct their actions
in coordinated operations of mutual interest. We placed the third option midway on
a continuum ranging from control-based to free agent-based organizing, and labeled the
two ends of the continuum as a Command approach and a Market approach,
respectively. Based on follow-on assessments of the Afghanistan workshop and the
growing collaborative network that emerged from it, significant improvements in
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coordination began to occur using the Community approach. Thus, we believe this
case demonstrates an important alternative option in dealing with the coordination
problem beyond recommendations for a single authority (e.g. Martin, 2000; Martin
and Miller 2000; Summers 2000), or a single leader (e.g. Howard 2000), or the ad
hoc perspective that relies on independent agents in the field (Aall 1996; Manenti
2001).
A fuller elaboration of this three-fold typology will be important for the future if
it is to serve as a foundation for our theoretical understanding and practical
resolution of coordination problems during peace operations. Central to this effort
will be specifying the conditions under which each approach is likely to be successful.
Two conditions emerge from analysis of the Afghanistan case.22 The UN’s 1997
effort to create the strategic framework was designed to deal with post-conflict
reconstruction, one particular phase in the continuum of peace operations. The
success of the Community approach, and the limitations of the Command and the
Free Agent approaches in this situation, suggests that the Community approach may
be a better fit for recovery and reconstruction efforts. Alternatively, one could
speculate that a Command approach is likely to be more effective in dealing with
open hostilities because of the need for a clear authority structure and well-defined
objectives. We see the benefits of the Command approach in Kosovo when the UN
authorized the establishment of an international civil presence in Kosovo (UNMIK)
to provide interim administration, and NATO authorized a large international-led
force (KFOR) to provide security. Thus, different phases of peace operations may
call for different organizing approaches.
This line of reasoning also suggests the need for an ontological fit between the kind
of problem that each phase of peace operations presents as a challenge to intervention
efforts and the type of organizing approach employed to address it (Bradley and
Roberts forthcoming). Building on previous research, that has identified different kinds
of problems (Simple, Complex, and Wicked),23 we postulate that some problems are
better managed by certain organizational approaches than others—Simple Problems by
a Command approach; Complex Problems by a Market approach; and Wicked
Problems by a Special Purpose Community approach (see Bradley and Roberts
forthcoming).
In this post-9/11 world there is much at stake in ensuring that peace operations are
successful in restoring security and rebuilding the political, economic and social
infrastructure to ensure societal viability for countries-in-crisis. The highly publicized
difficulties of the US top – down approach to post-war peacekeeping and reconstruc-
tion efforts in Iraq, and the enormous implications for Middle East and even world
stability, only underscores how timely and critical is the role that peace operations play
in this uncertain age of international terrorism. Clearly, different approaches to
organizing peace operations are needed. It is our hope that this work not only
establishes some of the theoretical underpinning for this important effort, but also
inspires other social scientists to join in this urgent task.
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NOTES
1 There have been 53 peace operations since 1948. The United Nations’ earliest interventions involved
‘‘traditional’’ military operations such as monitoring cease-fires, separating hostile forces and maintaining
buffer zones. Complex missions, that involve simultaneous political, military and humanitarian activities,
have characterized its interventions since the end of the Cold War. For our purposes here, it will not be
necessary to make distinctions between traditional and complex operations.
2 Definitions of peace operations vary from country to country and organization to organization. The UN’s
distinctions among peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are sufficient for our purposes here.
Peacemaking deals with conflicts in progress and attempts to end them with the tools of diplomacy and
mediation. Peacekeeping addresses traditional military operations and complex missions that incorporate
military and civilian efforts in the aftermath of war. Peacebuilding refers to activities that reintegrate
combatants into civilian society, strengthen the rule of law, improve respect for human rights, provide
technical assistance for democratic development, etc. (Brahimi 2000: 2 – 3). For those interested in a more
elaborate typology see McClean (1996).
3 The case information is taken from a series of documents written on Afghanistan. See the following: Basic
Premises of Principled Common Programming, (n.d.); Donini (1996); Donini, et al. (1996, 2004); Draft Strategic
Framework for Afghanistan, (1997); Inter-Agency Mission Report (1997); International Forum on Assistance to
Afghanistan (1997); Mission Report (1997); Towards an International Aid Strategy for Afghanistan (1997); Making
a Reality of Principled Common Programming (1998); Strategic Framework for Afghanistan (1998); Wischi-
Cestari et al. (1998); An Independent Strategic Monitoring Unit for Afghanistan Rationale and Terms of Reference
(1999); Next Steps in Afghanistan (1999). Evaluation for this case relied on three evaluation reports done by
two reviewers familiar with the UN system—one hired as an outside consultant and the other served as an
internal consultant. The case description and analysis also draws on the first author’s documentation and
experiences as designer/facilitator of the Islamabad workshop.
4 For example, some insisted that relief and development should be conditional on a change of the Taliban’s
gender policy. Others argued that without international aid, the condition of women in Afghanistan would
continue to deteriorate.
5 The Mission Team members included: UN staff from the Department of Political Affairs, Department of
Humanitarian Affairs (now OCHA), United Nations Development Program; participants from the World
Bank, UNESCWA, OXFAM and the UN Staff College; three consultants assigned by the UN Coordinator
for Afghanistan, and two staff members assigned by the manager of the World Bank’s resident mission in
Islamabad; and a four person UN Staff College Team to assist the Mission Team in conducting a workshop
that was to be a focal point for all of the in-country partners.
6 All quotations in this paragraph are from the UN’s Inter-Agency Mission Report on Afghanistan (1997).
7 The Mission Team leader himself had plans to retire from the UN within the year.
8 Specifically, the roles of team members were never clarified; planning, organizing and team building
activities were limited or nonexistent; anticipated in-country visits by the Mission Team did not occur;
coordination among the agencies and individuals involved in the Mission Team was poor; and there was little
effort to link project activities with regional and local UN field offices.
9 Specifically, they identified 247 strategic issues of mutual concern. Grouping the issues into twenty-five
categories, they identified fourteen major strategic issues on which they wanted to focus. Using Bryson’s
approach (Bryson 1996), small groups then developed strategies and action plans for each issue.
10 The following is an illustration of the Mission Team leader’s top – down approach to the workshop.
Materials generated at the January 1997 Ashgabad conference were supposed to be disseminated to
workshop participants. Attended by over 300 participants, the Ashgabad conference produced a
comprehensive set of working papers, assessments and submissions, with the expectation that they would
be incorporated into the Islamabad workshop. Instead of distributing these documents, the team leader made
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the decision to retain them as background material for the Inter-Agency Mission Team who would meet to
draft the strategic framework after the workshop was over. This action produced discontent among the
workshop participants; some interpreted the action as an attempt to ‘‘control information’’ and ‘‘control the
agenda’’ (Mission Report 1997).
11 See Donini et al. (2004) for additional details on strategic framework’s development within the UN system.
12 The strategic framework in Afghanistan was replaced by the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
(UNAMA) that became operational with the signing of the Bonn Agreement in December, 2001 (Donini et
al. 2004).
13 For instance, even the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator did not attend the Islamabad workshop in
September/October, but left the country to attend his own training program. Upon returning to his offices
in Islamabad, Pakistan, he ‘‘distanced’’ himself from important decisions in the last stages of the drafting
process by forming his own advisory group of four consultants to work with the Mission Team to complete
the drafting process.
14 The differences between headquarters and field staff perspectives that made implementation challenging, also
surfaced during the Islamabad workshop exercises. For example, when asked to prioritize their strategic
issues, field personnel from UN agencies and NGOs gave high priority to Afghanistan education, human
resource capacity building for in-country personnel, food security and improved staff quality. These strategic
issues did not even surface as high priorities among the headquarter-level representatives from donor
governments.
15 This is essentially the position taken by both the Mission Report (1997) and the Brahimi Report (2000).
16 In his own subsequent report, the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator revealed a high level of discontent
with the top – down organizing process (see Witschi-Cestari et al. 1998: especially 26).
17 Interagency Mission Report on Afghanistan, (1997: 1, emphasis added).
18 We use the term ‘‘social network’’ in its strict sociological sense as an analytic concept for describing the
structure of different patterns of relations among social actors, be they individuals or organizations (Mitchel
1969; Bradley 1987; White 1992). This is a different usage than that which has appeared in certain areas of
management and political science, where certain patterns of relations are regarded as ‘‘networks’’ that can
be ‘‘managed’’ or ‘‘controlled’’ by a willful, active agent (e.g. Kickert et al. 1997).
19 We sketch the three approaches as ideal-types, but there is not the space here to describe approaches that may
emerge from combining various elements from the three.
20 This important point is discussed in depth elsewhere (see Bradley and Roberts forthcoming).
21 Follow-up interviews a year later with some participants in the workshop pointed to the realization of some
of this potential community. From a sparse, disjointed network at the beginning of the workshop, a nominal
social collective with a rudimentary set of relations and structure had begun to emerge. Stakeholders
(including NGOs) began meeting at the Afghanistan regional and national levels and agreed to the
establishment of the Afghanistan Programming Body that was divided into five regional programs with
common programming mechanisms for regional coordination and common criteria for making decisions and
setting priorities. Although servicing this special purpose community was demanding and the transaction
costs were high, the UN’s Coordinator’s Office found they were able to achieve more unity of purpose
among the assistance community in Afghanistan than at any time previously (Donini, et al. 2004). As one
workshop member reflected, ‘the workshop provided the raw material for a consensus and gave legitimacy
to what came afterwards’.
22 Donini (2004) identifies two other conditions that may be important in developing a conceptual framework,
although they are beyond the scope of this article: level of direct superpower involvement and the
instrumentalization of humanitarian assistance for political gain.
23 Following Roberts (2000), we use the degree of consensus among stakeholders over problem definition and
problem solution to distinguish among Simple Problems (consensus on both problem definition and problem
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solution), Complex Problems (consensus on problem definition but disagreement about problem solution)
and Wicked Problems (conflict on both dimensions among the stakeholders).
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